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Introduction
As universalistic norms of moral justice 1 and acceptable governmental conduct, 2 human rights are largely created and protected by institutions. 3 If we want to understand how human rights can be realised in practice, we therefore have to study the conditions and processes of their effective institutionalisation. That is to say, we have to look at the ways in which organisations, procedures and practices are established or adapted so as to embed human rights norms in a particular social environment. 4 In the absence of a world government, and given the lack of other effective mechanisms for their global enforcement, the institutionalisation of human rights ultimately depends on states. 5 On the one hand, only states have--at least in principle--the resources, enforcement bodies and the monopoly on the legitimate use of force to implement rights effectively. 6 In practice, the entitlement and enjoyment of human rights is therefore usually tied to one's belonging to a political community that guarantees the human rights of its members. On the other hand, it is precisely the definition of community membership in nationalist, ethnic, religious, or other exclusionary terms that creates many of the problems to which human rights respond, and which presents one of the greatest obstacles to their full realisation. 7 International human rights law potentially reinforces these exclusionary tendencies by allowing for derogations and limitations of human rights in the name of national interests, and by prioritising the rights of national citizens over those of non-citizens. 8 In other words, the universal aspiration of human rights that everyone is entitled to simply by being human is in stark tension with the particularism of the contemporary political world order that continues to be structured by the principle of national state sovereignty. 9 This continuing tension requires the academic study of the institutionalisation of human rights to pay greater attention to the level of the state while moving beyond a focus on compliance with ambivalent international law that does not necessarily serve the aim of protecting human rights in the most effective way. 10 To put it in the words of the sociologist Lydia Morris, what is needed is an analytical framework 'which accepts both the expansive potential of universal human rights and the restrictive particularism of national closure, but steers a path between the two.' 11 This article constructs such a framework. Based on Max Weber's notion of the 'ideal type' (Idealtypus), 12 this article develops the sociological ideal type of the human rights state as a tool for the systematic empirical analysis and assessment of institutionalisation processes of human rights on the state level. To that end, it reworks Benjamin Gregg's political theory of the human rights state from a prescriptive model of how human rights ought to be fully realised into a non-prescriptive analytical grid that captures the legal, political, and wider societal dimensions of effective human rights institutionalisation. Based on the extrapolation of their core traits from human rights practice and the synthesis of these into a unified, coherent concept, the ideal type of the human rights state indicates the necessary structural conditions that are likely to contribute to the effective protection of human rights as socially constructed, locally valid state-based norms of potentially universalistic scope. By developing a comprehensive, non-prescriptive framework for the qualitative study and assessment of institutionalisation processes, this article seeks to contribute both to the multidisciplinary field of human rights research in general, and to the developing field of human rights sociology, in particular.
It begins by outlining the contributions and limitations of three of the most prominent conceptualisations of human rights institutionalisation: legalisation, socialisation into norm compliance, and cosmopolitanisation. After making the case for a perspective that is able to integrate the merits of these different approaches, the article takes Gregg's conception of the human rights state and reconstructs it as a vehicle for the design of a holistic framework for the empirical study of human rights institutionalisation. The third section explains the methodology behind Max Weber's 'mental construct' 13 of the ideal type before mapping out the ideal type of the human rights state on the basis of six essential features of contemporary human rights practice.
Finally, it is important to note that, in drawing on Gregg's notion of the human rights state, this article builds upon an understanding of the term as the normative ideal of a state in which human rights are fully realised, 14 rather than referring to the metaphor for a particular kind of social movement as proposed by Gregg in his more recent work. 15 Gregg's original formulation of the human rights state is a more promising starting point for developing a framework for the study of human rights institutionalisation because it puts primary emphasis on the structural conditions of their realisation. By combining elements from Gregg's original account with traits of his refined conceptualisation that are consistent with it, this article not only lays the foundation for a comprehensive analytical framework but also offers a specific interpretation of the concept of the human rights state.
Theories of human rights institutionalisation
How can we conceptualise the effective institutionalisation of human rights in a political world order that continues to be regulated by the idea of sovereign nation states? The multidisciplinary field of human rights scholarship has given three distinctive answers to this question: legalisation, socialisation into norm compliance, and cosmopolitanisation. Each of these approaches typically correlates with a predominantly legal, political or sociological perspective.
This does not mean that they are limited to the boundaries of any of these disciplines. Nor does it mean that lawyers, political scientists or sociologists interpret the realisation and effective institutionalisation of human rights necessarily and solely in legal terms, as norm compliance or in cosmopolitan terms. But this tripartite systematisation does indicate different emphases rooted in particular disciplinary traditions, as well as a general trend towards the diversification of the field and the emergence of more complex approaches. Yet, none of these approaches takes account to the same extent of the legal, political and wider societal dimensions, as well as of both the structural and discursive aspects, of human rights institutionalisation.
Legalisation
To the extent that human rights scholarship was, until the 1970s at least, largely dominated by lawyers, the institutionalisation of human rights was typically equated with their codification in national and international law. 16 They were conceived primarily as legal entitlements against states that rested on a political consensus on acceptable governmental conduct embodied by national and international human rights instruments. 17 The increasing prevalence of this interpretation was closely related to two connected developments during the second half of the twentieth century: the rise of the international human rights regime with the detente of the EastWest conflict in the 1970s, on the one hand, and, on the other, the global spread of the domestic codification of human rights in the course of decolonisation and the demise of the Soviet Union. 18 Today, formal reference to human rights norms can be found in many, if not most, constitutions, legislative bills of rights or bodies of common law around the world. 19 Indeed, as widely codified legal norms, human rights exist in social practice relatively independent from the recognition of philosophical assumptions about their normative foundation. 20 However, legal analyses were for a long time based on the misguided assumption that the codification and constitutionalisation of human rights would lead to positive effects automatically. They have therefore typically focussed on the legal technicalities, such as judicial interpretations and formal mechanisms for the ratification of international treaties, their incorporation into domestic law and protection by constitutions, specific legislation or common law principles. 21 Yet, international human rights treaties do not come with mechanisms for their automatic enforcement. 22 Because state governments are only to a limited extent willing to submit their interests to the rule of international law, the monitoring bodies of the UN lack any judicial powers and thus the authority to enforce the implementation or a specific interpretation of human rights norms against states. 23 But while this means that states continue to play a decisive role for the realisation of human rights in practice, both historical and contemporary analyses suggest that the positive effects of domestic constitutional rights guarantees alone are commonly exaggerated. 24 Many postcolonial governments refused to implement their constitutional human rights guarantees effectively, while others soon abolished their new constitutions entirely after gaining independence, and established some form of authoritarian rule. 25 Moreover, even in the legal history of liberal democracies such as Britain, the United
States, Canada or India, the judicial recognition of individual civil and political rights depended not so much on formal constitutional rights guarantees alone but on the development of financial and legal support structures for potential claimants. 26 Although legal scholars have recently started to broaden their analytical focus to include institutions such as ombudsman offices, national human rights commissions and legislatures, 27 it nevertheless tends to remain limited to the juridical dimension of human rights, leaving aside the political and societal conditions of their construction and protection. To be sure, their national and international legalisation arguably provides human rights advocates and victims of violations with a potentially vital resource in their struggles for justice and reparation. 28 The legal codification of human rights and the provision of legal remedies delivered by independent courts may be ultimately desirable for their realisation. But if their institutionalisation remains limited to the formal dimension of juridical safeguards alone, without providing effective protection of the norms behind these legal rights, then the mere legalisation of human rights may even inhibit their effective implementation.
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Socialisation into norm compliance
With the growing diversification of the field of human rights research since the 1980s, scholars from non-legal disciplines began to draw an increasingly complex picture of human rights institutionalisation. Under the impression of the rise and success of the international human rights movement during the 1970s and 1980s, more and more political scientists became interested in the underlying sociopolitical conditions and mechanisms for the successful institutionalisation of international human rights in states that had previously been involved in their abuse. 30 In contrast to the predominant legal understanding of compliance which refers to the observance of laws, treaties and court rulings, these scholars began to analyse human rights changes as political processes and tended to interpret compliance in more comprehensive terms. Moreover, proponents of the spiral model as well as other norms and compliance scholars often lose sight of the wider societal conditions of effective and enduring human rights institutionalisation. While they stress the role of movements and advocacy networks in that process, they do not sufficiently account for the fact that social movements and activists--whether nationally or transnationally organised--do not necessarily represent the majority of the people in their awareness and support of human rights. 35 As Risse et al. themselves acknowledge in a retrospective critical review, they did not imagine the possibility that, even in liberal rights-based democracies, human rights would not win out in public discourse. 36 Yet, the successful deployment of powerful counter-narratives to justify human rights curtailments in states like the US and the UK since 2001 demonstrates that the enduring and self-sustaining institutionalisation of human rights requires the raising of a human rights consciousness within society more widely than initially envisaged by the spiral model.
To the extent that political scientists in general, and proponents of the spiral model in particular, conceptualise the effective institutionalisation of human rights as necessitating the national implementation of the norms of international treaties and covenants, 37 they also tend to neglect the various problems that come with the international human rights regime. Empirical studies call into question whether ratifying international human rights treaties leads to greater human rights compliance, with evidence including limited positive effects to adverse effects. 38 The tendency of Western states to justify military interventions with the need to protect international human rights, and the resistance of states to comply with the ever-growing number of treaties, have undermined their enforceability but also their legitimacy more generally. 39 In part, these difficulties result from the fact that international human rights law is the contingent outcome of competing political interests of state governments. International human rights treaties and norms thus contain principles that do not serve the aim of protecting human rights in the most effective way but instead protect the sovereignty of states by allowing for governmental discretion, and for derogations and limitations of human rights in the name of national interests. 40 While international human rights law prohibits the discrimination of nonnationals, it also contains elements that tend to reinforce the prioritisation of the human rights of citizens over those of non-citizens, for instance, by limiting certain political rights to citizens and by recognising the right of only the members of national communities to freely determine their political status. 41 All of this means that international human rights law carries with it the continuing risk of undermining the universalistic aspirations that many of its norms contain. Insofar as compliance scholars and spiral model proponents embrace international human rights law and equate human rights with the international regime, their vocabulary tends to reflect that risk by unnecessarily restricting the focus of attention to the behavior of states towards their citizens. 42 An enduring institutionalisation of human rights on the ground that takes their universalistic potential seriously, however, seems to require more than 'some measure of political transformation' towards liberalisation and democratisation, as envisaged by the spiral model. 43 A corresponding analytical framework, on the other hand, requires greater categorical and normative distance to the international human rights regime in its present form, and must account for the wider societal implications of self-sustaining mechanisms for human rights protection. Sociological conceptualisations and methodologies can help to address these requirements.
Cosmopolitanisation
Compared to other disciplines such as law, political science and philosophy, sociology was a latecomer in the engagement with human rights research. This is usually attributed to the intellectual heritage of the discipline 44 which emerged in opposition to the legal foundationalism of moral and political Enlightenment philosophy. 45 From the 1990s onwards,
however, more and more sociologists began to set aside the traditional epistemological discomfort and to rediscover human rights as a subject that was in line with the discipline's long-standing interest in inequality issues and power relations. and, on the other, the concrete manifestations of cosmopolitanism in social practice. 50 Since human rights expanded under the conditions of the 'radically asymmetrical political-economic order' after the Cold War, sociologists are anxious not to treat the actually existing institutions and practices as the culmination of a normative cosmopolitan vision but as part of a contingent social process of cosmopolitanisation. 51 As part of this open, dynamic and contradictory process, human rights are always and necessarily embedded in power structures and, therefore, cannot simply be assumed to bring about greater equality and justice for citizens and noncitizens alike. 52 In one of the most comprehensive sociological studies so far, Kate Nash thus critically probes to what extent the institutionalisation of human rights within states can realise their universalistic potential as norms of global justice. 53 She does so by contrasting the cosmopolitan ideal of activists and philosophers that aims at the abolition of differences in the rights of citizens and non-citizens, with the actually existing cosmopolitanisation of law and citizenship.
In her study, Nash compares the institutionalisation of human rights in the UK and the United
States in the domains of law, government, activism and the public media. She deploys the ideal type of the cosmopolitan state in order to assess the extent in which both states have been transformed in their sovereignty and political legitimacy so as to allow for the full realisation of universal human rights. 54 But while Nash goes beyond the rather abstract social theories of cosmopolitanism, she refrains from exploiting the full potential of her idea. As an external standard, her construction of a sociological ideal type reaches beyond legal and political compliance with international human rights law, and it has the potential to serve not only as a critical benchmark but also as a guideline for identifying categories and dimensions for empirical analysis. Unfortunately, Nash does not explain the methodology behind the construction of the ideal type, nor the way in which she applies it as a critical standard in her study. Because she does not derive analytical categories from it, Nash's ideal type of the cosmopolitan state remains purely abstract and, therefore, ill-suited as the basis for developing a more comprehensive framework for the study of human rights institutions.
Moreover, her analytical focus on cultural politics leads to an overemphasis of the discursive elements in struggles over the meanings of rights and the entitlement status of claimants. This comes at the expense of considering some of the most significant structural elements of human rights institutionalisation, especially in Britain, such as parliamentary committees, national human rights commissions, and specific provisions of human rights legislation as applied by the courts. Yet, these institutions represent important structural safeguards and mechanisms of human rights protection as well as dedicated arenas for the negotiation of the scope and meanings of human rights norms. As such, they serve both as institutional transmitters and as boundaries for the discursive construction of human rights in law, politics, and wider society.
What is needed, therefore, is a conceptualisation of human rights institutionalisation that is able to integrate the legal, political and wider societal dimensions of that process into one comprehensive analytical framework while allowing for a normative distance to concrete institutions from human rights practice. The remainder of this article is dedicated to the development of such a framework by reconceptualising Benjamin Gregg's political theory of the human rights state into a sociological ideal type. it can serve also as a vehicle for the construction of a sociological, non-prescriptive ideal type because it is deeply rooted in sociological, anthropological and juridical insights from human rights practice. 56 As pointed out in the introduction, the following analysis draws on Gregg's original conception of the human rights state as a set of institutions, rather than his more recent proposal for a metaphorical human rights state consisting of a community of activists.
The political theory of the human rights state
The roots of the human rights state
Gregg's political theory of the human rights state is a response to the fundamental tension at the heart of human rights both in theory and practice: on the one hand, humanity cannot guarantee human rights, because rights norms of whatever kind depend ultimately on the recognition and enforcement within local communities. In the present world, human rights can be effectively protected only through the institutional infrastructure of states. 57 On the other hand, the currently prevailing form of the modern nation state is rather inadequate for the full realisation of human rights. This is largely because nation states operate along an exclusionary logic insofar as they tend to construct their political community in 'normatively thick terms':
they embrace the 'pre-political solidarity generators of blood, ethnicity, language, religion, or beliefs about a shared fate', 58 which all too often preclude non-nationals, immigrants, minorities and other particularly vulnerable groups of people from the equal recognition and protection of fundamental rights. 59 While Gregg acknowledges that liberal democratic states are much more likely than authoritarian regimes to recognise and protect human rights, he points out that they, too, struggle with human rights issues caused by the exclusionary logic underlying parts of these communities. 60 These issues range from slavery in India 61 to capital punishment, institutional racism and discriminatory, overly intrusive anti-terrorism policies in Western democracies. 62 As a possible solution of this dilemma, Gregg suggests to realise human rights by gradually transforming individual nation states into what he calls 'the human rights state'. 63 Unlike scholars who propose advancing human rights primarily through international institutions, through the creation of a global political community or through powerful states acting as 'stewards' for human rights, 64 Gregg makes a case for going into the reverse direction.
His model is based on the establishment of locally defined and locally valid human rights as positive state-based law. This alternative approach, he argues, is more likely to be effective in the promotion of a free local embrace of human rights than international law and institutions like the United Nations or the International Criminal Court have been. 65 Gregg's special emphasis of the local definition and recognition is rooted in his conceptualisation of human rights as socially constructed norms. That is to say, their validity does not depend on theories of natural law or god but, according to Gregg, on human beings defining, recognising and, to some extent at least, identifying with them. 66 To conceptualise human rights in that way means to recognise them in their quality as contingent claims to social justice that cannot exist as effective norms 'without the social and political context in which they are recognized and enforced.' 67 In that sense, human rights do not exist before politics, and they can only be effectively realised within a local political community. with 'deontic powers', to perform the function of a person that is entitled to the protection of her human rights. These powers would derive from the collective, more or less active acceptance of everyone's status as a human rights-bearing creature and from its institutionalisation in a corresponding system of social recognition. 72 Creating a field of recognition for that status requires, according to Gregg, the transformation of 'the normative grammar' of the nation state so as to turn human rights into an internal core feature of statehood. 73 Three domains of institutionalisation can be reconstructed from Gregg's theory that may also serve as guidelines for the development of an analytical framework.
First, human rights would have to become deeply enrooted in the state's political system and culture. This would imply that human rights become the highest instance, source and foundation, for the exercise of all legitimate political power and law-making. Moreover, in a polity seeking to preserve the state-based human rights of both its residents and persons outside of its territory and jurisdiction, the protection of human rights would be enshrined as a central aim in both the state's domestic and foreign policies. 74 Second, human rights would have to be effectively entrenched in the legal system. This means, on the one hand, they would have to be established as positive--that is, coercively enforceable--state-based law, accessible to everyone within the state's jurisdiction. On the other hand, human rights would function as the ultimate legal restraint of judicial, legislative and political powers, setting the boundaries for the legitimate interpretation and application of laws and policies. 75 Third, a human rights state would seek to facilitate the collective recognition of everyone's status as a human rights-bearer throughout society as a whole. 76 It would do so by means of 'institutionalized socialization,' 77 that is, by entrenching human rights in the community's social institutions to help socialise its members into a 'human rights consciousness.' 78 This consciousness implies being sensitive to issues of social justice and able to frame them in the language of human rights. But it also means to mutually recognise each other's human rights entitlements and to be able to claim one's human rights vis-à-vis the authorities of the state. 79 In promoting the free local embrace and support of human rights beyond the professional elites of the political and legal systems, the human rights state aims for the development of an inclusionary, normatively thin kind of political solidarity, compared to a solidarity based on the normatively thick terms of ethnic or cultural nationalisms. 80 The most important means for institutionalising human rights along these three dimensions and, in that sense, the fundament of any human rights state for Gregg, is their domestic constitutionalisation. By this he means to enshrine them in the state's constitutive rules of government as 'legally enforceable constitutional limits to the exercise of lawmaking and regulatory powers.' 81 Human rights would bind the political, juridical and legislative powers as the highest domestic instance of legitimate government. In so doing, they would not only replace nationalism as the main source and center of contemporary politics and law, but also limit state sovereignty to the extent necessary for their effective realisation. 82 At the same time, constitutionalising human rights combines 'the moral and the legal' thereby serving as the reference point for developing a human rights patriotism, that is, the emotional attachment to constitutionalised human rights as norms of universalistic scope. 83 Generating such a form of inclusionary and inherently transnational human rights solidarity would need to be reinforced through the legal order as well as public education. 84 International human rights norms and institutions, however, are considered by Gregg to play a highly ambivalent role. While they may in some cases be able to reinforce the local recognition and institutionalisation of human rights, they can also be counterproductive. First, the extensive lists of rights norms proposed by international human rights treaties presuppose the universality of a liberal, highly individualised societal structure and certain political, economic, cultural institutions whose existence should not necessarily be taken for granted or automatically considered to be desirable (e.g. market, marriage). Less extensive, but freely embraced and locally specific lists of human rights may have better chances of effective realisation in a particular community. 85 Second, international human rights instruments presuppose and reinforce the existence of nation states and of the exclusionary logic of nationalism. They intertwine nationhood with statehood by proposing a human right to nationality, and they provide for qualifications and derogations of many human rights in the name of national interests so as to render them practically ineffective. Finally, international human rights law may be counter-productive for the effective local implementation of human rights norms insofar as its treaties and institutions may be perceived as the expression of a particular kind of imperialism, as something forced upon a community. This perception may be reinforced by governments referring to international human rights law in order to justify military interventions that have, as a matter of fact, rather different objectives.
Therefore, the 'surest route to individual human rights' for Gregg is through their local, collective recognition and through their protection by the structures of the modern sovereign
state, yet now reconfigured as the human rights state: 'local political culture, if charged with protecting the human rights it embraces, is more likely than any nonlocal culture to be vigilant in protecting them.' 86 
Limitations of the human rights state theory
Nonetheless, Gregg is aware of the limitations of his normative vision, and of the hurdles for its realisation in political practice. First, he acknowledges that the human rights norms generated and protected by a human rights state are only potentially universally valid. Unlike the often ineffective international law treaties postulating the universal validity of human rights that are supposed to have always already existed, the human rights state recognises and protects human rights effectively yet only within the limits of its sovereign territory and jurisdiction.
But these norms can become universally valid beyond the state-level if more and more communities came to embrace and institutionalise them in their domestic political and legal systems. 87 Second, a community of human rights states would not result in the establishment of a global cosmopolitan polity or in a world public legal order based on a universally agreed set of human rights. 88 As human rights in Gregg's model could be whatever a particular community constructed as human rights, different states might create different schemes of human rights, or interpret the same rights differently. 89 However, given the intellectual and political history of the human rights idea, Gregg suggests that there would probably be a considerable overlap between the specific human rights conceptions and contents recognised by different states. 90 Third, and perhaps most importantly, a human rights state cannot circumvent the fact 'that agreement on how best to understand, and how to resolve, issues of great social import is often only partial at best.' 91 It cannot resolve all the numerous, often-intractable problems of modern political community, and it cannot bring about conflict-free political communities or untroubled trans-state relations. 92 Precisely because human rights (and, consequently, the human rights state) are the products of human thought and action, they will always remain the subject of debate and conflict between different stakeholders, lobby groups, and political parties, even where (or because) they are deeply entrenched in the constitution and social consciousness.
On the other side, there are inherent limits to the form of the state as such that cannot be entirely overcome through its transformation into a human rights state. Some interests of state actors in domestic and foreign policies always differ from those of its citizens and from the aim of the equal recognition and protection of everyone's human rights. These may reflect the self-interests of political, judicial or administrative elites, or they may result from the influence of pressure groups representing divergent particularistic interests. Furthermore, there is an inherent and insuperable tension arising from the fact that a state 'would quickly cease to be a state' if it had no borders at all, and if it would not grant at least some privileges to, and place some corresponding duties on, its citizens compared to non-citizens. 93 In other words, even in a human rights state there would be a structural necessity to sometimes prioritise the interests of its citizens over those of non-citizens, and this structural tension would likely be a constant source of political conflict. Gregg thus argues for the importance of enshrining the principle of the indiscriminate granting of state-based human rights to citizens and non-citizens, to residents and people outside of its sovereign territory, in the fundamental rules of government of a polity as well as in the community's political self-conception. For the human rights state, in that sense, 'has no foundation other than itself'.
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Reconstructing the human rights state as a sociological ideal type
Despite its limitations, Benjamin Gregg's notion of the human rights state lends itself as a vehicle for the construction of a sociological ideal type precisely because it does not ground human rights in an otherworldly imagination. It is distilled from empirical insights into the structural conditions of human rights institutionalisation. It is the synthesised product of insights from human rights practice; its achievements as well as its shortcomings and failures.
Instead of assuming their universal validity, it is rooted in an understanding of human rights as socially constructed norms that emphasises their historicity and social particularity. Yet, Gregg is primarily interested in the normative conceptualisation of the best possible way to realise human rights effectively. Express affirmation and normative commitment to a particular form or institution of human rights, however, would defeat the purpose of constructing an analytical framework that seeks to grasp the various ways in which human rights are institutionalised on the ground, and to critically assess their potential to realise human rights effectively. 95 The reconceptualisation of Gregg's notion of the human rights state as a sociological ideal type therefore requires, as a first step, to read the concept not as a normative vision of how human rights ought to be institutionalised but as an analytical construct in Weber's sense.
What is an ideal type?
Max Weber coined the term 'ideal type' at the beginning of the twentieth century to characterise the conceptualisation of typifications in the historical and social sciences, compared to the typifications in natural sciences. 96 Weber borrowed the term from Georg Jellinek 97 and adapted it in order to reconstruct and explain the reasons and ends behind the patterned meaningful action of individuals by way of idealising abstraction. 98 In an attempt to synthesise the most promising elements of the opposing methodological camps of positivism and subjectivism, Weber's ideal type was meant to provide a tool for the structural analysis of social institutions on the basis of regularities in the subjective meaning of social actors. 99 The ideal type has its point of departure in Weber's conceptualisation of social science as an 'empirical science of concrete reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft)'. 100 In setting out how 'concrete reality' is apprehended and analysed, Weber explains that we filter the 'infinite multiplicity' of events characterising the social experience of reality according to the significance that individual phenomena have for us. 101 This significance results from the cultural values and the meaning that social actors--including social scientists--bestow on specific actions and events. 102 Social science, according to Weber, is therefore necessarily rooted in the subjective meaning created by social actors as well as in the presuppositions, the values and interests, of the researcher. 103 For Weber, all social-scientific analysis begins with a selection process in two stages. 104 First, through the bestowal of meaning, social actors create 'a broad category of facts which are appropriate objects of social-scientific analysis'. 105 In a second step, researchers choose a particular topic for investigation, a segment of those facts, according to their own theoretical interests and values. The result is a specific collection of facts which represent an abstraction from concrete reality as experienced by individual social actors. 106 An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia.
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While Weber speaks of 'a utopia', it is important to note, however, that he carefully delineates his conceptualisation of a sociological ideal type from normative models that are intended to prescribe a particular vision of reality based on ethical imperatives. 108 Instead of referring to what ought to exist, the ideal type is to be understood as an analytical construct 'which is "ideal"
in the strictly logical sense of the term.' 109 By this Weber means that its purpose is to construct 'relationships which our imagination accepts as plausibly motivated and hence as "objectively possible" and which appear as adequate from the nomological standpoint.' 110 'Ideal', in this sense, refers to an abstraction from empirical reality that consciously exaggerates or extrapolates the essential features--the idea--of particular phenomena and rigorously synthesises these characteristics into a unified and logical concept.
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While the ideal type is unsuitable 'as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance', it can serve as a 'purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components.' 112 The relevance of the ideal type lies in its comparative function, in its potential to serve as a tool for the systematisation and assessment of particular cases according to their approximation to, or deviation from, a theoretically constructed type. 113 The construction of ideal types is thus not an end in itself but has significance only as a methodological means.
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With regard to the empirical study of the institutionalisation of norms of moral justice such as human rights, Weber's conceptualisation of the ideal type is a particularly promising tool, for at least three reasons. First, by providing conceptual guidance for the investigation of empirical processes and structural conditions of the institutionalisation of human rights, an ideal type can serve as an analytical grid that captures a wider range of aspects than approaches oriented towards compliance with international legal norms. Second, because the ideal type represents a theoretical, systematic abstraction from factual institutions, it allows for a certain normative distance from the norms under scrutiny, as well as from particular forms of their institutionalisation. Finally, it nevertheless allows for the assessment of concrete processes and institutions, but according to criteria of the probable realisation that are extrapolated from different core traits of those norms themselves.
The sociological ideal type of the human rights state
Understood as an ideal type, the human rights state refers to the conditions for the effective institutionalisation of human rights, based on the extrapolation of their core traits and the synthesis of these into a unified, coherent concept. That is to say, on the one hand, the ideal type of the human rights state is based on factual elements of human rights practice. On the other hand, it is--to put it in Weber's terms--the product of the 'one-sided accentuation' of some of these elements according to their internal logic while omitting other elements that undermine that logic and, therefore, their effective institutionalisation.
More specifically, the ideal type of the human rights state is based on the extrapolation of six essential characteristics of human rights practice as identified by Gregg.
First, human rights are social constructions and, therefore, 'the products of social and political creation and manipulation'. 115 As norms of justice 'produced through social processes of framing and construction' 116 , they are historical and cultural particulars whose scope and validity depend on their local interpretation and recognition by social actors. 117 If human rights are to become effectively institutionalised, they have to be deeply enrooted in the identity and belief system of local political communities, and woven into their underlying structural conditions. 118 Second, despite various scholars emphasising the power of local or transnational social movements to create human rights norms themselves 119 , human rights remain a state centric concept. Their origins lie in historic declarations of natural rights that aimed at curtailing the power of rulers and opening up political and legislative processes to classes who were previously excluded from government. 120 With the foundation of the modern national state in nineteenth century-Europe, the constitutionalisation of 'natural rights of man' served as a source of legitimacy for the exercise of political power. 121 Even when deployed by the abolitionist movement or women's rights activists in North America and Western Europe, their universal rights claims were all ultimately directed at the recognition by governments and authorities within particular nation states. 122 Today, the efficacy of human rights norms as inscribed into international law still depends on the recognition and implementation by national legislatures, judiciaries and executive authorities. Moreover, it is only in the name and with the resources of states that international human rights law can be institutionalised, and only states are subject to it. 123 Third, while in historical perspective the institutions of modern nation states have been among the most effective enforcers and enablers of human rights for members of their political communities, 124 they also represent a fundamental obstacle to the realisation of human rights as universalistic norms of social justice. This is because they tend to be grounded in the imagination of political community in normatively thick, exclusionary terms. 125 If nationalism, ethnicity, religion or essentialist conceptions of culture serve as the primary sources of political legitimacy and solidarity, they often lead to the preclusion of non-nationals, immigrants, minorities and vulnerable groups of people from the equal recognition and protection of human rights. 126 Insofar as international human rights law reinforces the prioritisation of national citizens' human rights over those of non-nationals, it too inhibits the closure of the 'citizenship gap' 127 in the provision of human rights protection. What is required hence for the effective institutionalisation of human rights as universalistic norms is the transformation of the modern nation state as the prevailing form and structural principle of political world order. 128 The 'normative grammar' of nation states would need to be rewritten in a way that creates a field of recognition of everyone, citizens and non-citizens alike, as bearers of locally valid, state-based human rights. 129 To that end, human rights would have to become constitutionalised domestically in order to render them an internal core feature of statehood that binds all political, juridical and legislative powers and serves as a reference point for the socialisation of social actors into a 'human rights consciousness'. 130 Yet, as the formal constitutionalisation has historically proven to be far from sufficient for their realisation, 131 human rights would also need to become firmly rooted in the following, more specific ways. In any case, the ideal type of the human rights state is not a prescriptive utopia for a conflict-free and equalised political community. Rather, it is an analytical device indicating the structural conditions that are likely to enable the realisation of human rights as socially constructed, locally valid norms of potentially universalistic scope. In so doing, it serves as a yardstick for the analysis and assessment of actual processes of human rights institutionalisation that goes beyond thin or thick conceptions of compliance with international human rights law.
An analysis guided by the ideal type of the human rights state would investigate,
(1) whether and how comprehensively human rights have been institutionalised in the political, legal and wider societal spheres of a political community.
(2) It would have to study how these human rights safeguards are being applied in practice; that is, whether they are truly accessible, how their potential powers and competences translate into practical effect, and whether human rights are indeed being defined in universalistic terms. Yet, it is important to point out, once again, the boundaries of this framework.
Understood as a sociological ideal type, the human rights state represents neither a causal model nor a normative roadmap to the local realisation of universal human rights norms. Its principal purpose is to serve as a tool for analysing and assessing factual institutionalisation processes by comparing them to an abstract, external yardstick that has been constructed according to the inner logic of core aspects of human rights practice. Because it is based on a particular interpretation and the hypothetical extrapolation of certain aspects of human rights practice, the human rights state has no analogy in social practice. Moreover, it says relatively little about the lists of rights that a state has formally committed to institutionalise and, accordingly, little about the realms of conflict that remain untouched by them. In any case, human rights will never be, and were never meant to be, a panacea for social and political conflict, and will therefore likely remain themselves the subject of political controversy. Finally, within the conceptual boundaries of the ideal type of the human rights state, the universality of human rights refers primarily to their local validity as state-based rights equally granted to all human beings within the jurisdiction of a particular state and subject to its domestic and foreign policies. In an abstract and speculative sense, they could become universally valid beyond the individual statelevel only in the form of a historically contingent, politically achieved overlapping agreement between different human rights states.
Despite these limitations, this article nevertheless hopes to contribute to multidisciplinary human rights research by integrating different approaches in the field into one comprehensive framework that is able to capture the legal, political and wider societal dimensions of human rights institutionalisation. As a non-prescriptive tool for the qualitative empirical study and assessment of institutionalisation processes, the ideal type of the human rights state is firmly rooted in sociological methodology that suspends the question of the normative justification of human rights. It thereby offers an alternative to the largely quantitative body of research that is based on conceptions of effective human rights institutionalisation as compliance with international human rights law norms.
